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THE OTHER PATH OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Miguel Schor* 
A.V. DICEY, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM (J.W.F. Allison, ed., 2013). Pp. 
400. Hardcover $ 119.85.  
 
STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013). Pp. 270. Hardcover $ 88.12.  
INTRODUCTION 
Although constitutional experts no longer believe the United States Constitution to 
be the preeminent constitutional model for new democracies to emulate,1 the core features 
of the Constitution such as writtenness, constitutional entrenchment, and judicial review 
have become universal.2 The American revolutionaries articulated a set of grievances that 
revolved around the British government’s failure to respect liberty3 and proposed as a so-
lution that constitutions should be written and difficult to change.4 Although judicial re-
view was not hardwired into the text of the Constitution, it has become accepted as a means 
to effectuate constitutional limits.5 In short, a liberal democracy without a written and en-
trenched constitution policed by judges has become (almost) unthinkable. 
There is one highly successful, albeit non-influential, exception to American consti-
tutional hegemony. The British constitution sits athwart the path of global constitutional-
ism and consequently has long bedeviled comparative constitutional theorists who do not 
                                                          
 * Professor of Law, Drake University School of Law.   
 1. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 762 (2012). 
 2. See id. See also GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM HEARD AROUND THE 
WORLD, 1789-1989 (2009). 
 3. See generally JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2011); 
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967). 
 4. GORDON S. WOOD, THE IDEA OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON THE BIRTH OF THE UNITED STATES 171-80 
(2011); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 5. The success of the Supreme Court’s attempt to wrest control over the meaning of the Constitution was 
not guaranteed. The exercise of judicial review faced considerable opposition in the early days of the Republic. 
See DWIGHT WILEY JESSUP, REACTION AND ACCOMMODATION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND 
POLITICAL CONFLICT 1809-1835 (1987). The dramatic expansion of judicial review during the Lochner era also 
aroused considerable political opposition. See Miguel Schor, Constitutional Dialogue and Judicial Supremacy, 
(Drake Univ. Law Sch. Research Paper No. 12-02, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1730202.  
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quite know what to make of British exceptionalism.6 While the American constitution pro-
vides a legible template for how a constitution might preserve liberty, the same cannot be 
said of the British constitution, which is largely illegible to outsiders as it is found scattered 
in court cases, statutes, and political understandings called conventions. It is a common 
law constitution.7 There is no single document, as Thomas Paine pointed out in the eight-
eenth century,8 that is called the British constitution. If longevity is the touchstone of a 
successful constitution, however, the British constitution’s lack of global influence is puz-
zling.9    
Two recently published works of comparative constitutionalism seek to remedy Brit-
ain’s constitutional isolation. A.V. Dicey was the Vinerian Professor of English Law at 
Oxford University in the late nineteenth century when he wrote what became the most 
important work on the British constitution, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution.10 Dicey’s comparative work, however, consisted of a series of lectures given 
primarily between 1895 and 1900 that remained unpublished until 2013. Professor J.W.F. 
Allison, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law, is to be commended for editing these 
lectures so that Oxford University Press could publish them as A.V. Dicey’s Comparative 
Constitutionalism.11 Stephen Gardbaum, the MacArthur Foundation Professor of Interna-
tional Justice and Human Rights at the University of California Los Angeles School of 
Law, is a twenty-first century comparative constitutionalist theorist. His work on judicial 
review in the British Commonwealth—The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutional-
ism12—is a seminal work that will undoubtedly influence scholars around the globe. These 
two monographs illuminate why constitutional theorists should pay attention to British 
constitutionalism. 
BRITAIN’S EXCEPTIONAL CONSTITUTION 
Writing a full century after the American Revolution, A.V. Dicey understood that 
the sun was setting on the global influence of British constitutionalism, as written consti-
tutions were superseding unwritten ones around the globe.13 Dicey turned to comparative 
constitutionalism to explicate Britain’s exceptional constitution. He began by criticizing 
                                                          
 6. Not all theorists see the British constitution as standing outside the broad stream of Western constitution-
alism. See, e.g., Giovanni Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion, 56 POL. SCI. REV. 853 (1962). 
Ironically, the American revolutionaries whose new constitution effectively buried the British constitution on the 
global stage thought it provided the best historical exemplar of a constitution that preserved liberty. BAILYN, 
supra note 3, at 66-67. They also believed, quite obviously, that they could improve on the British constitution.   
 7. See MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 6-41 (2013); ERIC 
BARENDT, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 26-45 (1998). 
 8. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN: BEING AN ANSWER TO MR. BURKE’S ATTACK ON THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION 47 (Prometheus Books 1987) (1791). 
 9. ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG, & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 
(2009). 
 10. A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION INTO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1967). 
 11. A.V. DICEY, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM (J.W.F. Allison ed., 2013). 
 12. STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (2013). 
 13. DICEY, supra note 11, at 157.  
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the term “unwritten constitution,” which is commonly used to refer to the British consti-
tution, as a “lax and popular one.”14 There is no single document called the British consti-
tution, but many of its key principles can be found written down in statutes and cases. The 
real difference between the British and American constitutions, he argued, is that while 
some constitutions are “made,” others have “grown” over time.15 The British constitution 
has four distinctive characteristics not readily found “in the constitutions of other coun-
tries,” which are antiquity, continuity, spontaneity, and originality.16 
The antiquity and continuity of the British constitution derives from an important 
conceptual distinction between the American and British constitutions. The American con-
stitution is something separate and apart from the government.17 The principles of the Brit-
ish constitution, on the other hand, are largely derived from the “best” practices of the 
British government.18 There is no clear analytical distinction between the constitution and 
the government since the constitution is understood in light of what the British government 
does.19 A rich literature examines British constitutional history and celebrates how British 
institutions safeguard liberty or decries their failure to do so.20 The story of the British 
constitution, in short, is the story of how its ancient and continuous political practices 
evolved over time.21 
The most important difference between the British and American constitutions turns 
on what Dicey termed spontaneity. The British constitution, Dicey argued, is the “unde-
signed result of spontaneous efforts suggested at different moments”22 and resembles, 
therefore, an old mansion, 
 
[W]hich instead of being built all at once, after a regular plan, and ac-
cording to the rules of architecture at present established, has been 
reared in different ages of the art, has been altered from time to time, 
and has been continuously receiving additions and repairs suited to the 
taste, fortune, or conveniency of its successive proprietors.23 
 
The unplanned nature of the British constitution differs markedly from the concep-
tual underpinnings of the American constitutional project. The American Constitution is 
the product of the Enlightenment, when faith in reason was virtually unassailable24 and 
                                                          
 14. Id. at 22. For a searching critique of the use of the term “unwritten” to refer to the British constitution, 
see ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW (2003). 
 15. DICEY, supra note 11, at 172. 
 16. Id. at 174. 
 17. CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 1-22 (1947). 
 18. BARENDT, supra note 7, at 26-34; LOUGHLIN, supra note 7, at 5-39. 
 19. For a classic statement of this position, see J.A.G. Griffith, The Political Constitution, 42 MOD. L. REV. 
1 (1979). 
 20. BARENDT, supra note 7, at 26-34; LOUGHLIN, supra note 7, at 5-39. 
 21. In the United States, on the other hand, there is considerable disagreement over the role that evolving 
political practices should play in construing the constitutional text. Living constitutionalists are more likely to 
look favorably upon political practices in interpreting the Constitution than are originalists. See, e. g., N.L.R.B. 
v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
 22. DICEY, supra note 11, at 183. 
 23. Id. at 182 (internal citation omitted).   
 24. See AMERICA AND ENLIGHTENMENT CONSTITUTIONALISM (Gary L. McDowell & Jonathan O’Neill eds., 
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consequently, people across the Atlantic world began writing down and codifying systems 
of customary law.25 Hamilton neatly captured this distinction in the very first of the Fed-
eralist Papers, when he asked “whether societies of men are really capable or not of estab-
lishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined 
to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”26 
Lastly, Dicey argued that the British constitution is “not in any sense a copy of any 
foreign” constitution.27 The same, he argued provocatively, cannot be said of other consti-
tutions as even “American constitutionalism is primarily and mainly based upon English 
ideas.”28 The American revolutionaries believed the British constitution to be a fine model 
worthy of emulation. Their core complaint was not that the British constitution was defec-
tive, but that “in their case the principles of the constitution had been violated.”29 In par-
ticular, the principle of separation of powers and the “form” of the United States constitu-
tion were “borrowed from England.”30 Dicey conceded, though, that a written constitution 
that is superior to the government is an important departure from British constitutionalism 
that “worked a far greater change in the nature of the constitution itself than American 
constitutionalists probably realized.”31 
Writing in an era when written constitutions were rapidly displacing unwritten 
ones,32 Dicey unsurprisingly sought to defend the virtues of an historical constitution: “Po-
litical arrangements . . . which have been framed to meet an actual want are likely to 
achieve their immediate object, and having endured have probably met the requirements 
of the time.”33 The point Dicey makes is one that Thomas Paine and Edmund Burke fa-
mously disagreed on. In the wake of the French Revolution, Burke wrote an impassioned 
defense of British common law constitutionalism.34 Burke contended that it was a mistake 
to seek radical constitutional transformation because the past was an important source of 
stability.35 Thomas Paine wrote Rights of Man: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke’s Attack on 
the French Revolution in response.36 Paine criticized Burke and argued that reason, not 
tradition, should be the touchstone of constitutionalism.37 Dicey’s defense of Britain’s tra-
                                                          
2006). The key events that transformed the British constitution—the English revolution and bill of rights—oc-
curred before Enlightenment ideas came into vogue. LOUGHLIN, supra note 7, at 14-18. 
 25. While Americans were busy codifying their public law arrangements in 1787, the French turned to codi-
fying their private law in 1804. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 27-31 (2007). 
 26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 27. DICEY, supra note 11, at 20. 
 28. Id. at 76.   
 29. Id. at 77. 
 30. Id. at 78-79. 
 31. Id. at 78. 
 32. Even in the British Commonwealth, written constitutions were becoming the norm. Canada, for example, 
adopted the British North America Act in 1867 and Australia adopted the Commonwealth of Australia Constitu-
tion Act in 1900.   
 33. DICEY, supra note 11, at 187. 
 34. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (J.G.A. Pocock ed., Hackett Publ’g 
Co. 1987) (1790). 
 35. Id. at 217. 
 36. See PAINE, supra note 8.   
 37. Id. at 40-41. 
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ditional constitution is not as famous as Burke’s, but it is one that comparative constitu-
tionalists should pay attention to. The long-term success of the British constitution in pre-
serving liberty suggests that it contains lessons that partisans of written constitutions can 
ill afford to ignore. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 
Although judicial review first became linked with written constitutions in 1803,38 
the practice of writing and entrenching constitutions spread more rapidly around the globe 
than did judicial review.39 Prior to World War II, many written constitutions were enforced 
by elected officials, not judges. The logic of Marbury has proven irresistible,40 however, 
and contemporary written constitutions are almost invariably associated with judicial re-
view.41 The British constitution, on the other hand, long resisted the American idea that 
judges should play an outsize role in protecting liberties. The key principle of British and 
commonwealth constitutionalism is that Parliament enjoys constitutional and legislative 
supremacy. It is understandably difficult to accommodate constitutional judicial review, 
which gives judges the power to authoritatively explicate the constitution, with the princi-
ple of parliamentary sovereignty.42 In any case, the British generally believed that their 
existing constitutional arrangements worked tolerably well until the 1960s.43 In 1997, the 
Labor Party won a landslide victory that enabled it to undertake a number of constitutional 
reforms.44 One of those reforms was the Human Rights Act of 1998 which moved Britain 
into the modern constitutional world by empowering judges to construe rights.45 
Stephen Gardbaum’s The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism exam-
ines the distinctive manner in which a handful of commonwealth nations—the United 
Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada—adapted judicial review to the strong role histori-
cally played by Parliament in protecting rights.46 Each of these polities constitutionalized 
rights and empowered judges to construe bills of rights in the late twentieth century.47 
Rights protection had long been conceptualized as a bipolar world in which either judges—
the American model—or legislators—the British model—had the final constitutional 
word.48 There has been considerable debate over the merits of the two systems.49 Professor 
                                                          
 38. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 39. Miguel Schor, Mapping Comparative Judicial Review, 7 WASH. U. L. REV. 257, 261-70 (2008). 
 40. Miguel Schor, The Strange Cases of Marbury and Lochner in the Comparative Constitutional Imagina-
tion, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1463, 1466 (2009). 
 41. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 2-4. 
 42. An unwritten constitution with a powerful legislature makes it difficult but not impossible for judicial 
review to take root. The Israeli Supreme Court successfully managed to do so in spite of Israel’s lack of a written 
constitution. See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Village, 49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.). 
 43. VERNON BOGDANOR, THE NEW BRITISH CONSTITUTION 3-4 (2009). 
 44. Id. at 42. 
 45. Id. at 59-60. 
 46. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 2-4. 
 47. See DAVID ERDOS, DELEGATING RIGHTS PROTECTION: THE RISE OF BILLS OF RIGHTS IN THE 
WESTMINSTER WORLD (2010).   
 48. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 1. 
 49. Compare, for example, Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 
1346 (2006), with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1693 (2008). Contemporary works on the British constitution disagree on the advisability of adopting constitu-
tional judicial review. Compare LOUGHLIN, supra note 7, and TOMKINS, supra note 14 (both authors take a 
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Gardbaum argues that the Commonwealth model of constitutionalism “represents a third 
approach” to constitutional protection that “occupies the intermediate ground in between 
the two traditional and previously mutually exclusive options of legislative and judicial 
supremacy.”50 
The Commonwealth model of judicial review consists of “two novel techniques for 
protecting rights”—“mandatory pre-enactment political rights review and weak-form ju-
dicial review.”51 The first requires that legislators deliberate over the constitutionality of 
proposed legislation.52 This differs markedly from the practice in nations with legalized 
constitutions where ex ante political review tends to be “ad hoc, voluntary and unsystem-
atic.”53 In the United States, for example, a natural division of labor has emerged where 
Congress focuses on policy issues and generally leaves constitutional issues to the Su-
preme Court.54 The vigorous exercise of judicial review by courts may debilitate elected 
officials from taking on a function that does not have an electoral pay-off.55 In a modern 
democracy, moreover, elected officials have a number of different issues that occupy their 
time, ranging from servicing constituents to raising money for re-election. By institution-
alizing ex ante political review, the new Commonwealth model squarely places constitu-
tional issues on the agenda of elected officials.56 
The second aspect of the new Commonwealth model is that it institutionalizes weak-
form judicial review.57 Courts are empowered to review whether legislation comports with 
a polity’s bill of rights. This is a departure from the classic British constitutionalism that 
Dicey analyzed in the late nineteenth century when elected officials authoritatively deter-
mined rights. Courts do not have the final word, though, over the meaning of the Consti-
tution as elected officials may override58 or ignore judicial decisions.59 The new Common-
wealth model differs formally from the strong form of judicial review practiced in the 
                                                          
skeptical view towards legalizing the British constitution), with BARENDT, supra note 7, and BOGDANOR, supra 
note 43 (both authors argue in favor of legalizing the British constitution). 
 50. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 1. 
 51. Id. at 25. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 25-26.   
 54. See J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 20-22 (2004). Members of Congress are more likely to debate constitutional 
issues when there is substantial political controversy over legislation or when there is a concrete threat of a 
judicial veto. Id. at 65-66. 
 55. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. 
REV. 129, 156 (1893). 
 56. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 26. 
 57. Id. 
 58. The notwithstanding clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for example, allows legis-
latures to temporarily override constitutional interpretations of many charter rights. See Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms § 33, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 
(U.K.). The efficacy of the provision is questionable as elected officials seldom rely on it to overrule the Canadian 
Supreme Court. Miguel Schor, Judicial Review and American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 46 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 535, 559-60 (2008). 
 59. The British Human Rights Act (“HRA”) constitutionalizes the European Convention on Human Rights 
by making convention rights enforceable in British courts. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 156-61. Section 4 of 
the HRA empowers courts to declare that laws are incompatible with convention rights but it is up to Parliament 
to determine how to proceed. Id. at 157-58. The HRA “separates the judicial power to review legislation for 
compatibility with protected rights from the power to invalidate or disapply legislation deemed incompatible.” 
Id. at 158. 
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United States. Formally speaking, the Supreme Court has the last word in constitutional 
interpretation unless its decisions are overruled by constitutional amendment. In practice, 
though, strong form review shares some of the characteristics of weak form review, as 
long-term shifts in public opinion mark the outer boundaries of what courts may do.60 By 
affording elected officials the final word over constitutional interpretation, the new Com-
monwealth model decouples judicial review from judicial supremacy. 
Gardbaum persuasively argues that there is a constitutional pay-off to the new Com-
monwealth model.61 Pre-enactment review enables politicians to play a constructive role 
in shaping rights discourse. The language used by courts often gives short shrift to moral 
and practical issues that elected officials, who are not constrained by formal tests and rules, 
may be better able to articulate.62 In any democracy, however, elected officials may seek 
to override unpopular rights and are likely to ignore those that are not politically salient.63 
Weak form review addresses these issues by empowering courts to effectuate constitu-
tional rights. A bill of rights, coupled with judicial review, moreover, fosters “public 
recognition” of rights,64 which helps obviate the problem that rights inscribed on parch-
ment may be ignored in practice.65 Courts, though, suffer from pathologies when effectu-
ating rights. Courts make mistakes, thereby undermining democratic self-governance.66 
Nor are courts as adept as legislatures in reaching compromises that the citizenry will ac-
cept.67 Providing elected officials with the final word over constitutional interpretation 
addresses these problems. The new Commonwealth model, in short, produces a “better, 
more democratically defensible balance of power between courts and legislatures.”68 
CONCLUSIONS 
Britain is the world’s oldest liberal democracy yet constitutional theorists have 
largely ignored its peculiar constitutional arrangements. A.V. Dicey’s recently published 
Comparative Constitutionalism and Stephen Gardbaum’s The New Commonwealth Model 
of Constitutionalism make a persuasive case that it is a mistake to ignore British constitu-
tionalism. As Americans find themselves trapped in endless disagreements over whether 
evolving political practices should be celebrated or reviled in constitutional interpretation, 
and over whether the Supreme Court or the people is the master of the Constitution, they 
                                                          
 60. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policy Maker, 6 
J. PUB. L. 279 (1957), reprinted in 50 EMORY L.J. 561 (2001); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: 
HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 61. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 47-66, 222-44. 
 62. Thayer, supra note 55, at 138. See also Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 
115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1381-84 (2006). 
 63. For two classic descriptions of this problem, see United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 155 
n.4 (1938) and JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1981). 
 64. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 55. 
 65. See Daryl Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 657 (2011). 
 66. This problem is typically associated with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) and its progeny. See 
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS 
JURISPRUDENCE (1993). 
 67. The unceasing political disagreement in the United States over abortion suggests that judicial constitu-
tional supremacy may undermine the ability of political actors to compromise over deeply contested moral issues. 
See Schor, supra note 5, at 11-13. 
 68. GARDBAUM, supra note 12, at 74-75. 
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could do worse than look at constitutional developments in the polity that the framers, at 
least, believed provided a fine model of how liberty might be protected. 
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